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One or many Cohesion Policies of the European Union? On the
differential economic impacts of Cohesion Policy across member
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ABSTRACT
To what extent do regions in different member states of the European Union beneﬁt from Cohesion Policy? A spatial
regression discontinuity design approach offers distinct but fully comparable estimates of regional impacts for each
individual member state. Cohesion Policy has a positive European Union-wide impact on regional growth and
employment. However, a large part of the growth bonus is concentrated in Germany, while impacts on employment are
conﬁned to the UK. The picture in Southern Europe is less rosy. In Italy, positive impacts on employment do not survive
the Great Recession, while in Spain economic growth beneﬁts are limited to the recovery period.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1980s, the asymmetric spatial distribution of
the beneﬁts of the process of European economic inte-
gration became progressively more apparent. At the same
time the enlargement of the European Union (EU) to
Greece, Portugal and Spain reinforced the call for collective
action in favour of regions whose economic development
was signiﬁcantly below the average. An EU-level policy
seemed the best response to an EU-wide challenge, acting
as an internal redistributive mechanism able to serve the
double political purpose of: (1) compensating less devel-
oped regions for their reduced ability to beneﬁt from the
Single Market; and (2) maintain politically sustainable
net contributions to the EU budget for countries (such as
Spain, Portugal and the UK) gaining limited ﬁnancial
beneﬁts from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (at
the time modelled upon the needs of French and German
farmers).
In this context, Cohesion Policy has become one of the
cornerstone policies of the EU, today accounting for one-
third of the total EU budget (European Commission,
2017). The number of beneﬁciary regions has also
increased with the progressive enlargement of the EU to
new member states. The set of objectives Cohesion Policy
is intended to serve has also increased in the framework of
the overarching EU strategy for growth and jobs (Europe
2020) and in response to the Great Recession. The govern-
ance of Cohesion Policy has also evolved with a diversiﬁed
engagement of local, regional, national and EU-level auth-
orities at different stages of the policy design, implemen-
tation and evaluation (Mendez, 2011). Notwithstanding
the sustained efforts of the European Commission towards
simpliﬁcation and thematic concentration, the complexity
of the programmes funded under the Cohesion Policy
umbrella has grown exponentially as well as the insti-
tutional and managerial capacity needed for the implemen-
tation of the corresponding projects (Mairate, 2006). In
addition, the practical returns in terms of additional local
economic impacts of the ‘place-based approach’ introduced
on the basis of the recommendations of the Barca Report
(Barca, 2009) are still hard to evaluate.
The high-level political debates on the post-2020 EU
Budget have called into question the survival of Cohesion
Policy as an EU-level policy. The probable departure of
the UK – a net contributor to the EU budget – from the
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EU together with the mounting pressure from nationalistic
and Euro-sceptic parties in many member states have
forced a 360-degree reconsideration of the value added of
all EU policies (Crescenzi, Di Cataldo, & Giua, 2019a;
Crescenzi, Fratesi, & Monastiriotis, 2019b). Various pro-
posals have been put forward for post-2020 EU policies,
including an increase in the national co-ﬁnancing of agri-
cultural subsidies and a renationalization of Cohesion Pol-
icy in order to ‘drop some pan-European policies and “do
less more efﬁciently”’ (statement by Jean-Claude Juncker,
European Commission President) (Beesley, 2017).
Changes in the net budget contributions of many mem-
ber states and the increased public scrutiny on the econ-
omic returns to national funds transferred to the EU
budget make the assessment of the economic impacts of
Cohesion Policy (and their distribution) a key existential
factor for this policy area. How (and to what extent) regions
in different member states beneﬁt from Cohesion Policy?
Are regional impacts persistently diversiﬁed across
countries? Does it still make sense for all member states
to transfer national resources to fund an EU-level regional
policy?
These fundamental questions are still unanswered.
Most of the existing studies that employ counterfactual
techniques in order to identify the impacts of Cohesion
Policy conclude that the policy has a positive effect on
growth and employment. These same studies also suggest
that positive effects are contingent upon several local and
policy conditions such as funds absorptive capacity, local
context and intensity of treatment. However, all this evi-
dence is only valid for the EU as a whole, with no insights
into the country-speciﬁc nature of the estimated impacts,
their heterogeneity across countries and possible compo-
sition effects.
This paper aims to ﬁll this gap by applying counterfac-
tual methods to estimate how economic impacts of Cohe-
sion Policy vary across countries, unveiling if (and to what
extent) the regions of some member states beneﬁt from
Cohesion Policy persistently more than others. It relies
on a spatial regression discontinuity design (RDD), lever-
aging as threshold for the treatment the spatial boundaries
(policy-change boundaries) between Objective 1 regions
(treated) and non-Objective 1 regions (non-treated). Fol-
lowing this approach, different thresholds can be identiﬁed
in each country with Objective 1 and non-Objective 1
regions. This makes it possible to construct different (but
fully comparable) counterfactual scenarios in different
countries and reproduce the same identiﬁcation strategy
in each country while preserving EU-wide comparability
of the results. For each country, this RDD approach com-
pares economic outcomes (economic growth and employ-
ment) of the treated and non-treated NUTS3 regions
sharing a policy-change boundary. Contrary to existing
RDD studies that could only estimate a single EU-wide
‘impact’ coefﬁcient (leveraging the eligibility threshold of
a regional gross domestic product (GDP) < 75% of the
EU average GDP), the innovative spatial RDD approach
makes it possible to ‘unpack’ the aggregate impact of Cohe-
sion Policy and estimate individual fully comparable
coefﬁcients for Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK both
before and after the Great Recession. By using the spatial
RDD to net out the estimations from any confounding fac-
tor inﬂuencing the policy’s impact within the country, any
differences in the estimated coefﬁcients across member
states can be ascribed to country-speciﬁc aspects related
to national-level speciﬁcities in quality of governance
and/or implementation models.
The analysis of the NUTS-3 regions for Germany,
Italy, Spain and the UK suggests that EU Cohesion Policy
works differently in different member states, with very het-
erogeneous country-speciﬁc economic impacts. The results
show that Cohesion Policy has exerted a positive and sig-
niﬁcant EU-wide impact on both regional economic
growth and employment. However, regional economic
impacts are not evenly distributed across member states.
A large part of the regional growth bonus generated by
Cohesion Policy is concentrated in Germany. Conversely,
impacts on regional employment are conﬁned to the UK.
The picture for beneﬁciary regions in Southern European
member states is less rosy. In Italy, impacts are short-
lived: the positive impacts on employment did not survive
the Great Recession. Conversely, in Spain, economic
growth beneﬁts emerge only in the recovery period with
no relief on structural unemployment problems. National
macro-institutional factors play a key role in shaping het-
erogeneous returns from Cohesion Policy. These results
offer an innovative contribution to the debate on the econ-
omic value added of a supra-national EU-wide approach to
the design and implementation of public policies and on
the optimal degree of ﬂexibility among member states
(Henke et al., 2018). The evidence suggests that the
place-based approach popularized by the Barca Report
(Barca, 2009) needs to be balanced by new responsibilities
and empowerment of individual member states. Some
national models of intervention are indeed effective and
impactful; others are not. Where performance is more dis-
appointing, member states should take full responsibility
and be empowered to act accordingly. This would also
counteract the ‘blame Brussels’ rhetoric that has dominated
the campaign for the 2019 European elections in many
countries.
EXISTING EVIDENCE AND KEY GAPS
The link between Cohesion Policy and territorial perform-
ance has been studied from different perspectives, with
different methodologies, with reference to different spatial
scales and time horizons (Molle, 2007). The literature is
now vast but still far from a consensus on the overall impact
of the policy on economic territorial cohesion1 in particular
with reference to what would have happened to the most
disadvantaged areas of the EU in absence of an EU-wide
Cohesion Policy (European Commission, 2014).
The most recent wave of studies on the impacts of
Cohesion Policy has approached the deﬁnition of a suitable
counterfactual scenario by adopting treatment effect
methods. Policy impacts, for example, in terms of econ-
omic growth and employment, are netted out from the
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confounding inﬂuence of all other characteristics of the ter-
ritorial ecosystem in which the policy effect of interest is
embedded.
A large part of the studies in this research stream con-
clude that EU-wide impacts have been positive on economic
growth and employment (Becker, Egger, & von Ehrlich,
2010, 2013; Pellegrini, Busillo, Muccigrosso, Tarola, &
Terribile, 2013) and on innovation and transport infrastruc-
ture (Ferrara, McCann, Pellegrini, Stelder, & Terribile,
2017). The heterogeneity of these impacts has also been
investigated, suggesting that economic impacts depend on
the local quality of government (Accetturo, de Blasio, &
Ricci, 2014), on expenditure intensity (Cerqua&Pellegrini,
2017), on regional contextual conditions (Bachtrögler, Fra-
tesi, & Perucca, 2019, in this issue) or on the sectorial struc-
ture of the local economy (Percoco, 2017).
However, all existing evidence is valid only at the EU
aggregated level. All existing studies leverage the EU-
wide eligibility threshold for the assignment of the status
of ‘most disadvantaged region’2 (namely Objective 1, con-
vergence or less developed regions in different program-
ming periods) that grants access to the large majority of
Cohesion Policy funds. These studies compare regions
(at the NUTS-2 level) whose GDP levels are close to the
eligibility threshold. The assumption is that these regions
are similar in all characteristics except for receiving (for
those with a GDP below the threshold) or not (for those
with a GDP above the threshold) Cohesion Policy fund-
ing. This identiﬁcation strategy leverages a single threshold
associated with a single joint control group composed by all
EU regions with similar levels of regional GDP. Regions
whose GDP is slightly above the 75% threshold and
belonging, for instance, to Italy are compared with other
regions whose GDP is marginally below this same
threshold but which belong to Germany, or Spain or any
other EU member state. With this approach, a single
aggregate coefﬁcient has been estimated, capturing the
net impact achieved by Cohesion Policy (treatment) for
the most disadvantaged regions in Europe as a whole
(i.e., on the joint EU-wide-treated group). Therefore, the
estimated economic impact (positive, negative or absent)
is the impact achieved by Cohesion Policy for the whole
EU.
On the other side of the spectrum, the existing litera-
ture has relied on counterfactual methods in order to esti-
mate the impact of Cohesion Policy in individual EU
countries. Mitze, Paloyo, and Björn (2012) look at the
effect of regional subsidies on labour productivity growth
in Germany, concluding that they are effective, but only
up to a certain maximum treatment intensity; Bondonio
and Greenbaum (2014) focus on ﬁrm-level effects in a
large northern Italian region showing that the magnitude
of the estimated effects is increasing in the economic
value of the incentives; Barone, David, and de Blasio
(2016) look at the case of Abruzzo (Italy) to study the
long-term effects of EU regional policy, concluding that
the policy fails to move treated regions towards a persist-
ently higher GDP growth path; Di Cataldo (2017) studies
the impact of EU funding in the UK, suggesting a positive
effect of EU Objective 1 funds in terms of jobs and econ-
omic performance; Giua (2017) focuses on the Italian
Mezzogiorno, estimating positive effects of the EU
regional policy on regional employment. These country-
level quantitative case studies are based on different identi-
ﬁcation strategies, rely on different measures of output
(with different data sources) as well as heterogeneous terri-
torial deﬁnitions/spatial units of analysis, preventing any
comparability of the results across member states. At the
same time, these studies have shed a light on substantial
differences across countries in terms of impacts and on
the importance of country-speciﬁc factors in conditioning
success and failure. Taken together, single-country coun-
terfactual studies conﬁrm the conclusions of other relevant
streams of research on Cohesion Policy (Medeiros, 2017):
EU-wide aggregated results might average out important
differences and mask signiﬁcant country-level heterogen-
eity and composition effects.
Therefore, a fundamental question at the very centre of
the current policy debate remains open: Are (positive)
regional economic impacts persistently diversiﬁed across
countries?
A suitable empirical strategy able to answer this ques-
tion needs to meet three criteria. First – in line with both
streams of research reviewed above – it should keep ‘con-
founding factors’ under control by means of an appropriate
counterfactual. Second, it needs to estimate separated
impacts for each individual country. Third, the estimated
country-speciﬁc impact coefﬁcients should reﬂect exactly
the same identiﬁcation approach, thus remaining fully
comparable across countries (i.e., differences in impacts
across countries should not depend upon difference
between the control groups).
In order to satisfy these three conditions simul-
taneously, we need to estimate the Cohesion Policy impacts
on economic growth and employment in the regions of
each country separately while relying on the same identiﬁ-
cation strategy. Results based on traditional RDD settings
leveraging the 75% eligibility threshold are still valid when
regions across the entire EU can be matched and compared
according to the value of the forcing variable. However, this
approach is less helpful in a setting where observations to be
compared are bound to belong to the same country (in
order to produce country-speciﬁc estimates). If only regions
belonging to the same country and with very similar GDP
per capita levels (forcing variable) can be compared, a sharp
decrease in the number of possible comparisons makes the
estimation of the country-speciﬁc treatment effects
impossible. In addition, even when NUTS-3 regions are
chosen as spatial unit of analysis (increasing the number
of observations available in each country), the forcing vari-
able would still not vary within the same NUTS-2 region
given that eligibility for Cohesion Policy funds is granted
at the NUTS-2 level (i.e., all NUTS-3 regions belonging
to the same NUTS-2 region would still be assigned the
same value of the forcing variable).
A solution enabling country-speciﬁc estimations comes
– in this paper – from a spatial RDD: the geographical
coordinates of eligible and non-eligible areas are used as
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a forcing variable for the identiﬁcation of policy impacts.
This spatial approach to the identiﬁcation of policy
impacts has been extensively used in other ﬁelds of policy
evaluation (Black, 1999; de Blasio & Poy, 2017; Dell,
2010; Einio & Overman, 2012; Gibbons, Machin, &
Silva, 2013; Holmes, 1998; Jofre-Monseny, 2014;
Menon & Giacomelli, 2017; Papaioannu & Michalopou-
los, 2014), although only marginally employed for the
analysis of EU Cohesion Policy (Giua, 2017, for the case
of Italy).
In general, the identiﬁcation assumptions under the
spatial RDD is that at the cut-off of the distribution
(boundary), treated and non-treated observations (spatial
units) are similar in everything except for treatment (balan-
cing properties). Spatial RDD analyses normally take two
different approaches: border strategies or RDD polynomial
speciﬁcation with spatial forcing variables (distance from
the boundary or geographical coordinates). The ﬁrst
approach focuses on the narrowest possible spatial window
around the discontinuity (non-parametric approach). The
‘as good as random’ scenario in which observable (and
unobservable) characteristics are smoothly distributed
across treated and untreated observations includes only
the spatial units that are directly contiguous to the geo-
graphical boundary (on both sides) that divides treated
and the untreated areas to be compared. Conversely, with
the second approach, the treatment and control groups
include all spatial units belonging to the treated and the
untreated areas respectively, using distance from the eligi-
bility border or geographical coordinates as continuous
forcing variables as standard in the parametric approach
to RDD (Lee & Lemieux, 2010).
This paper leverages the latter approach and uses a
spatial RDD approach in order to identify fully comparable
country-speciﬁc estimates of the regional impacts of Cohe-
sion Policy.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
In order to identify comparable national-level effects, we
look at the spatial structure of EU Cohesion Policy: the
same discontinuity (Objective 1 versus non-Objective 1
regions) is captured by all administrative spatial boundaries
between Objective 1 and non-Objective 1 regions (policy-
change boundaries). Since these boundaries run across each
individual country, we can construct separate counterfac-
tual scenarios for each country and estimate the same
RDD model in each of them. The policy-change bound-
aries all respond to the same policy discontinuity (they
are the thresholds between Objective 1 and non-Objective
1 regions), thus the coefﬁcients that we will estimate are
fully comparable.
The policy-change boundaries relevant to the present
analysis are the administrative boundaries between Objec-
tive 1 and non-Objective 1 NUTS-2 regions that, for the
2000–06 policy Programming Period, can be identiﬁed in
Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, Spain and
the UK (Figure 1). The analysis necessarily excludes:
countries that are entirely eligible for Objective 1 status
(e.g., Portugal, Greece); that do not have suitable spatial
Figure 1. Country-speciﬁc counterfactual scenarios.
Note: Treated NUTS-3 regions (belonging to Objective 1 regions according to the 2000–06 Cohesion Policy eligibility criteria) are
shown in red; counterfactual NUTS-3 regions are shown in blue.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat and European Commission data.
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boundaries (for instance, the only treated areas in France
are the Overseas territories that do not share any physical
border with non-Objective 1 regions); or countries where
eligibility is grated at a different spatial scale (for instance,
the Flevoland area in the Netherlands).3
In line with the spatial RDD literature, for each policy-
change boundary, the NUTS-3 regions belonging to trea-
ted and non-treated NUTS-2 regions are matched with
each other according to the geo-coordinates of their cen-
troids (source: Eurostat), that is, the forcing variable in
parametric spatial RDD models.4
The policy treatment is represented by the Objective 1
status during the 2000–06 programming period, which is
captured by a dummy that takes a value of 1 for those
NUTS-3 belonging to an Objective 1 NUTS-2 region.
In order to account for the medium-run nature of policy
impacts, we look at impacts over the 2000–14 period. This
assessment period is divided into two subperiods. The ﬁrst
is the shortest-run possible period to assess the ex-post
impact of Cohesion Policy following the end of the pro-
gramming period in 2006. This ﬁrst subperiod covers the
entire time span of the policy implementation, taking
into account that expenditure was allowed for up to two
additional years after the end of the programming year
(and that, indeed, many countries concentrated a signiﬁ-
cant part of their actual expenditure toward the ﬁnal
years of the programming period; European Commission,
2014). Therefore, it goes from 2000 to 2010 (i.e., 2006 plus
two years of additional implementation plus a two-year
time lag to allow for the short-run effects of the policy to
emerge). This ﬁrst subperiod – which aligns this study to
other empirical work on the impact of Cohesion Policy –
includes the very initial years of the Great Recession offer-
ing insights on the capacity of the policy to truly address
regional structural resilience factors during the crisis (Cres-
cenzi, Luca, & Milio, 2016).
The second subperiod covers the more medium-run
effects of Cohesion Policy by focusing on the 2010–14
period that also coincides with the recovery phase following
the Great Recession. The Great Recession has presented
major challenges, in particular in the disadvantaged areas
of the European Union (European Commission, 2014),
deserving special attention in the analysis of the policy
impacts.
Economic impacts are analysed with reference to the
main intended outcomes of the policy: regional economic
growth and employment. By using Cambridge Econo-
metrics data, we consider as dependent variables changes
in: (1) regional gross value added (as a proxy for economic
growth available in a time series running up to the 2014);
and (2) employees in the manufacturing sector (as a
proxy for regional employment).5 In both cases, the vari-
ables are expressed in logarithmic growth rates for the
two periods of interest.
Country-speciﬁc economic impacts are estimated by
means of the model speciﬁed in equation (1) in each
country-speciﬁc scenario for Germany, Italy, Spain and
the UK.6 We run model 1 also for the aggregated sample
(estimating an EU-wide coefﬁcient) in order to check the
coherence of the results with other existing studies:
Dyit = b0 + b1Policyi,00−06
+ Policyi,00−06
∑3
r=1
g coordi + u borderi
+ eit (1)
where i is the NUTS-3 region; t is the temporal window
(2000–10 for the ﬁrst subperiod; 2010–14 for the second
subperiod); the dependent variable Δy stands for the logar-
ithmic growth rates in regional gross value added and in
manufacturing sector employment; ‘Policy’ is the Objective
1 dummy; and ‘Coord’ (i.e., longitude and latitude coordi-
nates of the NUTS-3 centroids) is the spatial forcing vari-
able, which takes a polynomial speciﬁcation (with a
polynomial degree of up to order 3 allowed to vary differ-
ently on the two sides of the cut-off) – this is also interacted
with the treatment dummy (Lee & Lemieux, 2010). In line
with the most recent RDD literature, the forcing variable
best speciﬁcation is selected according to the Akaike infor-
mation criterion (AIC). Finally, the model includes a set of
segment dummies (‘border’) that groups NUTS-3 sharing
the same segment of the policy-change boundary: within
each country the policy-change boundary is composed by
several segments, separating different regions. This ensures
that the selected policy-change boundary does not coincide
with individual regional boundaries, contributing to mini-
mize the risk that other regional conditions might change
in a statistically signiﬁcant manner at the cut-off together
with the treatment.
The balancing properties conﬁrm that all observable
characteristics (for which data are available at this spatial
scale) are equally distributed across the policy-change
boundary (Table 1): almost all the coefﬁcients estimated
by the regression of the Objective 1 dummy on the
cross-border covariates according to the speciﬁcation
selected for model 1 are not signiﬁcant. This suggests
that all regional characteristics – except for the treatment
assignment – are smoothly distributed across treated
(Objective 1) and non-treated (non-Objective 1)
NUTS-3 regions and the discontinuity associated to the
policy-change boundaries is related exclusively to the
treatment. The evidence is conﬁrmed also by other cus-
tomary tests performed in order to verify the exogeneity
of the threshold (see Appendix A in the supplemental
data online). In addition, usual concerns that commonly
apply to RDD analysis (i.e., the hypothesis of non-
manipulation around the cut-off7) do not affect the esti-
mates: NUTS-3 belonging to non-treated NUTS-2 can-
not put in place active strategies in order to be reassigned
to treated NUTS-2 regions.
The quasi-experimental properties of the counterfactual
scenarios conﬁrm that the proposed empirical strategy
makes it possible to compare NUTS-3 regions that are
similar in everything except for being treated (or not).
The confounding inﬂuence of any unobservable factors
that might be correlated to the policy’s effect at a subna-
tional level is removed from the estimates by the proposed
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identiﬁcation strategy. The estimated impacts, therefore,
capture the net effect of the policy on country-speciﬁc per-
formance in terms of regional growth and employment,
excluding the effects of any unobservable factors related
to contextual conditions that might change at the subna-
tional level (within-country heterogeneity). Estimated
coefﬁcients can be interpreted as comparable measures of
how Cohesion Policy has been able to promote regional
growth and employment in each national context. The
variability across countries is a measure of how the impact
of the same policy change across EU member states (cross-
country heterogeneity). The different signs and magnitude
of the estimated coefﬁcients can be attributed to the
national component of Cohesion Policy implementation
and to the macro-institutional characteristics of the indi-
vidual countries. The variability of these policy implemen-
tation and institutional conditions at the regional level is
‘netted out’ by the identiﬁcation strategy,8 making it poss-
ible to univocally to link the observed heterogeneity in
impacts to national-level conditions.
HOW DOES THE NET IMPACT OF
COHESION POLICY DIFFER ACROSS
MEMBER STATES?: COUNTRY-SPECIFIC
ESTIMATES
The coefﬁcients estimated with respect to economic
growth and employment reported in Table 2 refer to the
2000–10 period and capture the more short-run effects,
while Table 3 shows the corresponding results computed
for the 2010–14 period. Cohesion Policy has been one of
the primary tools leveraged by the EU in order to support
recovery after the Great Recession, especially in the most
disadvantaged regions. When the impacts of the Great
Recession started to unfold itself in the EU regions, signiﬁ-
cant funding reallocations have been allowed by the Euro-
pean Commission in order to support the most deprived
areas of the EU and, in some cases, in order to compensate
for cuts in national expenditure in key priority areas. There-
fore, by looking at the impacts of Cohesion Policy on econ-
omic growth and employment after 2010, we can get a
preliminary indication on the extent to which the policy
has supported recovery in the regions of different member
states.
For each period and dependent variable, the model is
estimated both for Europe as a whole (to validate the results
of the existing literature) and for each country separately (in
order to compute country-speciﬁc impacts).
Overall the baseline whole-EU results are in line with
the existing literature. We identify a positive effect of
Cohesion Policy on economic growth, with both sign
and magnitude of the coefﬁcient (Table 2, A) in line
with existing estimates (Becker et al., 2010, 2013;
Pellegrini et al., 2013). This conﬁrms that EU Cohesion
Policy produced an overall positive impact by generating
a ‘growth bonus’ in favour of the most disadvantaged
regions of the EU. EU Cohesion Policy has also a positive
impact on regional employment levels.9 Table 2(B)
shows that the support of Cohesion Policy to the most
disadvantaged regions in Europe made it possible to
achieve not only higher economic growth but also higher
employment levels.
Table 1. Balancing properties for the baseline covariates (pretreatment year).
Europe Germany Italy Spain UK
Population change 0.0001
(0.0007)
−0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0002
(0.0001)
0.0004
(0.0004)
−0.0004
(0.0003)
Natural population growth rate −0.0008
(0.0035)
−0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0008*
(0.0003)
0.0001
(0.0002)
−0.0001
(0.0001)
Migration rate −0.0056
(0.0039)
0.0002
(0.0003)
0.0001
(0.0001)
−0.0007
(0.0004)
0.0006
(0.0009)
Agricultural share −0.0041
(0.0034)
0.0002
(0.0003)
0.0001**
(0.0000)
0.0001*
(0.0000)
−0.0001*
(0.0000)
Service share 0.0020
(0.0012)
−0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0002
(0.0007)
0.0001
(0.0005)
0.0001
(0.0008)
Share of built area 0.0013
(0.0009)
−0.0001*
(0.000)
0.0001
(0.0001)
−0.0002
(0.0005)
−0.0004
(0.0003)
Vulnerability to climate change −0.1151
(0.0845)
−0.0002
(0.0005)
0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0001
(0.0001)
−0.0005
(0.0004)
Photovoltaic 0.0043
(0.0048)
−0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0002
(0.0006)
−0.0001
(0.0002)
−0.0000
(0.0001)
Notes: Variables are selected under the constraint of the data availability at the NUTS-3 level (we include all variables considered by previous studies and by
the European Commission, 2014). Robust standard errors are clustered at the NUTS-2 level. Coefﬁcients are estimated by applying model 1 to evaluate the
effect of the pretreatment value of observables on the treatment dummy. The best polynomial degree of the forcing variable is selected according to the
Akaike information criterion (AIC) criteria among the nine speciﬁcations of model 1 (we estimate the model by considering the polynomial degree of up to
degree 3, allowing it to differently vary below and above the cut-off of the forcing variable).
Signiﬁcance level: ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
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How are these positive economic impacts distributed
across countries? In terms of regional growth, Germany
is the big winner from Cohesion Policy. The results show
that regional beneﬁts in terms of economic growth are con-
centrated in German regions that drive the whole-EU
positive impact (Table 2, A). This suggests that the positive
aggregated impact identiﬁed in the existing literature might
be the result of a composition effect rather than a genuinely
EU-wide effect. The positive performance recorded in
terms of regional growth is not matched by an equally sig-
niﬁcant impact on employment levels. However, returns to
structural investment have still materialized in the form of
higher employment levels in German beneﬁciary regions
during the recovery period post-2010 (Table 3, B).
The second major winner from Cohesion Policy is the
UK. If UK beneﬁciary regions are not better off in terms of
economic growth they show a better performance than
non-beneﬁciary regions in terms of employment levels (in
line with the recent single-country analysis by Criscuolo,
Martin, Overman, & Van Reenen, 2019). The positive
impact in terms of new jobs in the UK beneﬁciary regions, –
conﬁrmed in both the short-run (Table 2, B) and the med-
ium-run (Table 3, B) – has been achieved by leveraging
limited resources. Funds earmarked to UK Objective 1
Table 2. Effects of Cohesion Policy on economic growth and employment (2000–2010).
Europe Germany Italy Spain UK
(A) Y: economic growth
Objective 1 0.0036**
(0.0011)
0.0354**
(0.0118)
0.0295
(0.0411)
0.5078
(0.5907)
0.0074
(0.0451)
R2 0.183 0.094 0.195 0.360 0.138
Polynomial degree 3–2 3–1 2–1 2–1 1–1
Observations 779 428 87 44 125
(B) Y: employment
Objective 1 0.0045*
(0.0017)
9.7737
(4.9094)
40.8626**
(12.8633)
−78.8229
(43.9912)
50.3325**
(16.6211)
R2 0.300 0.154 0.218 0.510 0.177
Polynomial degree 3–1 3–3 2–3 3–3 3–2
Observations 770 421 87 42 125
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the NUTS-2 level. The best polynomial degree of the forcing variable is selected according to the Akaike infor-
mation criterion (AIC) criteria among the nine speciﬁcations of model 1 (we estimate the model by considering the polynomial degree of up to degree 3,
allowing it to differently vary below and above the cut-off of the forcing variable). P-values of the Wald test of jointly signiﬁcance of the Objective 1 coefﬁ-
cients are: (A) 0.005 (EU–Germany); 0.033 (EU–Italy); 0.031 (EU–Spain); 0.045 (EU–UK); and (B) 0.012 (EU–Germany); 0.000 (EU–Italy); 0.006 (EU–Spain);
0.045 (EU–UK).
Signiﬁcance level: ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
Table 3. Effect of EU Cohesion Policy on economic growth and employment, 2010–14.
Europe Germany Italy Spain UK
(A) Y: economic growth
Objective 1 −0.0092*
(0.0024)
−0.3776
(0.4297)
41.1915*
(15.6782)
2.2226**
(0.5160)
7.6063
(5.3399)
R2 0.325 0.179 0.206 0.264 0.165
Polynomial degree 3–1 3–2 2–3 3–1 3–2
Observations 702 379 87 41 114
(B) Y: employment
Objective 1 0.0151*
(0.0069)
41.5978**
(13.2816)
−3.7066
(37.0892)
111.0092
(212.4177)
151.7883**
(46.6149)
R2 0.320 0.159 0.634 0.316 0.285
Polynomial degree 3–1 3–3 2–3 3–3 2–2
Observations 697 373 87 42 114
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the NUTS-2 level. The best polynomial degree of the forcing variable is selected according to the Akaike infor-
mation criterion (AIC) criteria among the nine speciﬁcations of model 1 (we estimate the model by considering the polynomial degree of up to degree 3,
allowing it to differently vary below and above the cut-off of the forcing variable). P-values of the Wald test of jointly signiﬁcance of the Objective 1 coefﬁ-
cients are: (A) 0.000 (EU–Germany); 0.000 (EU–Italy); 0.000 (EU–Spain); 0.000 (EU–UK); and (B) 0.009 (EU–Germany); 0.121 (EU–Italy); 0.049 (EU–Spain);
0.048 (EU–UK).
Signiﬁcance level: ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
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regions account for < 5% of the total funds allocated to
Objective 1 regions in Europe (European Commission,
1999), suggesting that the intensity of funding is a
second-order concern when compared with the more
macro-national and strategic framework conditions in
which territorial policies are implemented.
Very different is the experience of Southern European
regions in Italy and Spain.
In Italy, Cohesion Policy produced a short-term posi-
tive impact in the beneﬁciary regions that materialized
only in terms of regional employment (Table 2, B). How-
ever, this positive impact vanished after the crisis. The lack
of impacts on growth and the short-lived effects on
employment support the idea of Cohesion Policy working
as a means to maintain employment in subsidized low-pro-
ductivity jobs in the Mezzogiorno, a model that the Great
Recession has made unsustainable. The effects on Objec-
tive 1 regions’ employment seem to reﬂect the genesis of
short-term opportunities, which did not translate into sus-
tainable trends in the medium- to long-run (Boltho, Car-
lin, & Scaramozzino, 2018).
Spanish beneﬁciary regions absorbed almost 30% of total
EU expenditure in the 2000–06 period (EuropeanCommis-
sion, 1999). Nevertheless, at least until the crisis – and in
contrast to the EU as a whole – they have not beneﬁtted
from Cohesion Policy in terms of additional growth and
jobs. These results are fully in line with the evidence dis-
cussed above for the UK. It is not necessarily the amount
of funding that makes the difference, but rather the
(national) models of policy design and implementation and
the macro-level conditions. The existent literature offers
ample material to support this interpretation. Spain has
adopted a model of policy intervention largely unbalanced
towards transport infrastructure (Crescenzi & Rodríguez-
Pose, 2012; Crescenzi, Di Cataldo, & Rodríguez-Pose,
2016) and disconnected from the endemic challenges
in terms of skills, youth unemployment and other dimen-
sions of regional development such as social inequalities
(Castells-Quintana, Ramos, & Royuela, 2015). A positive
effect – in sharp contrast with the rest of the EU – emerges
in Spanish regions only during the 2010–14 subperiod in
terms of higher growth while unemployment problems
have remained unaffected. The extent to which this ‘growth’
bonus will materialize in the longer run remains to be seen.
CONCLUSIONS
Nowadays Cohesion Policy is expected to serve a diversiﬁed
set of objectives (that include economic growth, competi-
tiveness, employment, social inclusion, environmental sus-
tainability, innovation, etc.). Cohesion Policy is expected to
deliver results in all regions of the EU (not only in the most
disadvantaged areas), dealing with a hugely diversiﬁed set
of territorial conditions.
While scholarly and policy debates have extensively cov-
ered the challenges associatedwith the interaction between a
single unitary Cohesion Policy framework and diversiﬁed
territorial conditions, more limited has been the attention
devoted to the heterogeneity of impacts associated to
diverging macro-national conditions and models of
implementation. However, several studies have provided
relevant insights on the speciﬁcities of individual national
contexts and on their importance in shaping economic
and non-economic impacts (Medeiros, 2017). Further-
more, Brexit and the rise of nationalistic movements in vir-
tually all EU countries have put the role of the nation-state
back at the centre of the debate on the future of all EU pol-
icies. Which policies are better pursued at the EU level?
Which would be more effectively controlled by individual
member states? Answers to these questions with reference
to Cohesion Policy call for careful counterfactual assess-
ments of the net impacts of the policy in terms of both
growth and jobs as well as for clear comparable answers to
the distribution of these economic impacts across member
states.
This paper has contributed to these debates by applying
an innovative identiﬁcation strategy to a large sample of
NUTS-3 regions in different member states with hetero-
geneous national macro-institutional and policy
implementation conditions. This empirical strategy has
allowed an estimation of both EU-wide and country-
speciﬁc fully comparable policy impacts.
Based on this empirical strategy, the paper made a two-
fold innovative contribution to the existing literature. The
ﬁrst concerns the identiﬁcation of an EU-wide positive
impact of Cohesion Policy on both growth and employ-
ment. The second concerns the heterogeneity of these
regional impacts across member states.
Cohesion Policy has exerted a positive and signiﬁcant
EU-wide impact on both regional economic growth and
employment. The positive economic impact on regional
employment has survived the Great Recession and sup-
ported less developed regions in the recovery period. How-
ever, these positive effects are not evenly distributed across
the regions of all member states. Germany is the member
state where large part of the regional growth bonus from
Cohesion Policy is concentrated. Conversely, impacts on
regional employment are largely conﬁned to the UK. The
picture for Southern European member states is much less
rosy. Italian beneﬁciary regions have experienced better
employment performance, but this effect has ended with
the Great Recession. Conversely, Spanish beneﬁciary
regions have only beneﬁted from Cohesion Policy in terms
of better growth performance during the recovery phase
after the Great Recession with no impacts on employment.
Even if the Barca Report (Barca, 2009) re-centred the
debate onCohesion Policies around the importance of highly
localized factors conditioning success and failure, these results
show that macro-national factors remain central. Macro-
institutional conditions and models of intervention make
the difference in terms of impacts over and above the diversity
of local conditions.Early strategic decisions– such as the early
focus on innovation inGermany – have signiﬁcant long-term
consequences and are better taken at the national level with
more complete information and foresight capabilities as
well as more effective coordination. However, while the pre-
dicaments of theBarcaReport (and the adoptionof a bottom-
up approach) have resulted in a stronger role (and
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independence) being given to individual regions in the selec-
tion of the tools and in the implementation of the policy
(Crescenzi &Giua, 2016), the same is not true for the mem-
ber states. Implementation mechanisms and rules are the
same for all countries (e.g., ﬁnancial rules, certiﬁcation, co-
ﬁnancing procedures, project documentation requirements)
and they are thenoperationalized indifferentways indifferent
regions.
Would more ﬂexibility and autonomy given to the
member states reinforce the economic impacts of Cohesion
Policy? The results of this paper suggest that not only
models of intervention but also economic impacts are
already highly heterogeneous across countries. A nation-
based approach – with better adaptation of the policy to
the needs and overarching objectives of each individual
member state – might be the best complement (and indeed
a much needed counterbalance) to the current place-based
approach. More national-level adaptability and autonomy
might be the best response to the calls for renationalization
of key EU policies. While in the post-Brexit Europe terri-
torial cohesion remains an EU-wide public good – requir-
ing EU-wide coordination and ﬁnancial solidarity – the
most effective (and politically viable) approach to its
achievement might be premised on a stronger role to be
(re)assigned to the member states.
These considerations are based on the analysis of purely
economic impacts of Cohesion Policy (regional economic
growth and employment). However, Cohesion Policy aims
to promote regional development well beyond narrowly
deﬁned economic outcomes. The holistic and multidimen-
sional approach to regional development embraced byCohe-
sion Policy – in terms of social cohesion, environmental
sustainability, territorial governance, and cooperation and
spatial planning (Crescenzi, Fratesi, & Monastiriotis,
2017; Medeiros, 2017) – calls for a more comprehensive
and integrated approach to the evaluation of non-economic
impacts and their distribution across member states. The
lack of economic returns in some regionsmight well be com-
pensated by other non-economic impacts impossible to cap-
ture with the present analysis. How to reconcile the use of
rigorous quantitative counterfactual methods with the press-
ing need to capture a wider set of policy impacts remains in
the agenda for future research.
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NOTES
1. For a recent review on the different existing results, see
Crescenzi and Giua (2017).
2. Regions whose GDP per capita is below 75% of the
EU average were eligible for the status of Objective 1
(2000–06 Programming Period), Convergence (2007–13)
or Less Developed (2014–20) regions.
3. It is customary in the existing literature to exclude these
areas from estimation samples.
4. Islands (i.e., Canarias, Sardinia and Sicily) are necess-
arily excluded from the analysis.
5. By using this disaggregation, we can focus on the sector
that has been directly targeted by the policy, rather than
considering its effect on the whole employment structure,
which also includes sectors far from the aim and funding
of EU Cohesion Policy (e.g., ﬁnancial and public sectors).
Cambridge Econometrics missing data have been inte-
grated with correspondent data from national institutes.
6. We cannot estimate the country-speciﬁc models for
Austria, Belgium and Finland owing to the limited number
of ‘treated’ observations (NUTS-3 belonging to Objective 1
NUTS-2) in the individual samples (only three Objective 1
NUTS-3 in Austria, seven in Belgium and four in Finland).
7. Usually tested with the McCrary test (McCrary, 2008).
8. This is the reason why a traditional analysis of hetero-
geneity would not help in order to answer the research
questions. We would be forced to interact the policy
dummy (¼ 1 for NUTS-3 belonging to Objective 1
regions) with country-level variables.
9. Up to now, employment has been granted a weaker
attention in the existing literature, and among the papers
more methodologically aligned to our own work (counter-
factual methods); Becker et al. (2010) is an exception.
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